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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
is concerned, the unsuccessful attempt is as vicious as complete
success. It would appear that it is only in an exceptional case
that a penalty will be held to be disproportionate to the offense,
and that courts tend to give effect to the legislative policy respect-
ing the duration of punishment for crime, making little use of the
constitutional limitation.
B. D. T.
CONTIRACTS - SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE TO REQUIRE EXERCISE OF
OPTION. - P was a tenant under a lease giving it an option to pur-
chase the leased premises within seven days after notice of an offer
from a third party at a satisfactory price. On July 31st notice was
given to P of an offer to purchase, but the name of the offeror was
not contained therein. P received assurance on August 3rd from
the offeror's attorney that the offer was bona fide and that the
offeror was bound under the terms of the purchase contract. P
accepted under the terms of the option on August 9th. D, how-
ever, refused to comply with the option on the basis that P had
not accepted within the time set by the option, and conveyed the
premises to X, the undisclosed offeror. Among the terms of the un-
disclosed offeror's contract to purchase was a provision that the
offeror was to pay five hundred dollars from a fund held in escrow
if "by reason of their inability to effect suitable and proper finan-
cial arrangements" they should fail to purchase the premises. P
sought to have the deed to X set aside and to obtain specific per-
formance of the option. Judgment for P. Held, one judge dis-
senting, that P's acceptance on August 9th was in accordance with
the terms of the option, the notice of July 31st being insufficient be-
cause (1) the contract to purchase was conditional, and (2) the
notice failed to give P a basis of inquiry into the bona fides of the
offer. Peerless Dept. Stores v. George 1f. Snook Co.-
The court was of the opinion that the offer which X made to D
for the purchase of the property was not the type of offer cont=n-
plated by the option in that it contained a provision for stipulatect
damages.2 The inference to be gathered from the reasoning of the
court is that the provision made the contract one in the alternative.
So to hold would be tantamount to placing contracts with stipula-
tions for liquidated damages in the same category with alternative
contracts. The two types are closely interwoven' but may be dis-
115 S. E. (2d) 169 (W. Va. 1941), Rose, J., dissenting.
2 Majority opinion, Fox, J., concurring specially.
s Note (1929) 35 W. VA. L. Q. 367, 368.
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tinguished. A contract which gives either the promisor or promisee
an alternative between two or more performances is an alternative
contract,4 while liquidated damages may be defined as damages
fixed by the parties who enter into an agreement to avoid all future
questions of damages which may result from a violation thereof,
and to agree upon a definite sum as that amount which will be paid
to the party who alleges and establishes the violation. In the first,
a party may do one of two or more things and yet fulfill the con-
tract; in the second, he must perform the act or acts agreed upon,
or pay a sum certain as liquidated damages for the failure so to do.
To ascertain whether the contract is one in the alternative or one
with a provision for liquidated damages, the court ill consider the
contract as a whole in order to arrive at the intent of the parties."
The terms of the original contract to purchase clearly fail
,within the second class. The contract includes a provision for the
payment of five hundred dollars in the event of noncompliance,
and fails to give the promisor any alternative of performance. The
subject matter treated in this contract is of a type that readily lends
itself to a provision for liquidated damages. 7 The method of ascer-
taining damages for failure to fulfill a contract to purchase land
is nebulous 8 and as a result a provision for liquidated damages is
reasonable. The deposit of money to be forfeited in the event of
4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 325.
5 Welch v. McDonald, 85 Va. 500, 8 S. E. 711 (1888) ; Stoney Creek Lumber
Co. v. Fields & Co., 102 Va. 1, 45 S. E. 797 (1903).
6 Note (1929) 35 W. VA. L. Q. 367, 368: " To distinguish these two types of
contracts, the determining question must be, is the intention of the parties, as
ascertained from a fair interpretation of the contract, to form an absolute
agreement to do, or refrain from doing a particular act, followed by a stipu-
lation in relation to the amount of damages in case of breach, or is there
merely an engagement to do or refrain from doing an act, or pay a sum of
money, so that performance of the latter stipulation amounts to a perform-
ance of the contract, rather than damages for breach of an absolute agree-
ment. If the latter, it is a true alternative contract, and not one for liquidated
damages."
7 Charleston Lumber Co. v. Friedman, 64 W. V. 151, 61 S. E. 815 (1908);
Wilkes v. Bierne, 68 W. Va. 82, 69 S. B. 366, 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 937 (1910):
"In some cases, where, from the nature of the subject or from peculiar cir-
cumstances, the damages are uncertain and not ascertainable by any known
and safe rule, or where, from the nature of the case and the tenor of the
agreement, it is apparent that the damages have been the subject of actual fair
estimate and adjustment by the parties themselves, the sum named to be paid
for the breach may be inferred to have been intended as liquidated damages."
8 McCoRMicKc, DAMAGES (1935) § 46: "The value of land may be proved by
opinion evidence of those familiar with its value, by evidence of its location,
area, and productiveness, and, in most states, by evidence of the prices paid on
sales of similar land in the neighborhood within a reasonable time before or
after the time of valuation."
2
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failure to meet the terms of the contract also tends to indicate that
this was a contract with a provision for liquidated damages.9
The second reason for holding the July 31st notice of the offer
insufficient was that the name of the offeror was not included there-
in. The option was silent on the question of averment of bona fides
in the notice of the offer. Often such options in lease agreements
provide for assurance of the bona ides of the offer, 10 and if such
bad been stipulated in the lease agreement, the notice of the offer
actually given would have been insufficient. It is not contended
that if the offer made to the lessor had not been bona fide that P
'would have been under any duty to act,1 but it is suggested that
if the lessor was to have the burden of establishing bona fides in the
notice, such should have been included in the option.
P claimed that it should have some basis of inquiry into the
bona fides of the offer. The real inquiry desired was into the bona
fides of the lessor giving notice of the offer, since there could be no
fraud against the lessee unless the lessor was a party to it.'2 To
require bona fides in such a notice would presume that the lessor
intends to defraud the lessee and would place a burden on the
lessor to prove his innocence. Moreover, why should the notice
show bona fides? If the notice of the original offer is in fact
fraudulent, the lessee is fully protected even though he purchases
the property under the option.2
Finally it should be pointed out that the majority agreed that
sufficient notice was given on August 3rd. It is difficult to under-
stand that if notice was not sufficient on July 31st because the lessor
failed to show sufficient basis for inquiring into the bona fides of
the offer, why assurance of the offeror's attorney on August 3rd
should provide any better basis of inquiry.
W. H. S.
9 1 SEDGWIox, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1913) § 414: "Where the instrument refers
to a sum deposited as security for performance, or paid in advance to be for-
feited on default, the forfeiture, if reasonable in amount, will be enforced as
liquidated damages."
10 See the terms of the options in Slaughter v. Mallet Land & Cattle Co.,
141 Fed. 282 (C. C. A. 5th, 1905); Burleigh v. Mactier, 108 Atl. 84 (N. J. Ch.
1919).
11 Ogle v. Hubbel, 1 Cal. App. 357, 82 Pac. 217 (1905); Sargent v. Vought,
194 App. Div. 807, 185 N. Y. Supp. 578 (1920).
12 Since the offeror is bound by the acceptance of his offer, the only in-
quiry would be into the 'bona files of the lessor. Bad faith could exist only
on the part of the lessor, or the lessor acting in collusion with the offeror.
is WALsH, EQumY (1930) § 106.
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